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Introduction 
This thesis seeks to explore the notion of human rights abuses as “planned misery”. Legal 
scholar Susan Marks makes use of this concept as she explores the root problems of human 
rights abuses.1 She finds that history is a product of social actions, not an unchangeable 
entity, and thus can be remade.2 This is an important insight that the thesis seeks to 
implement into its approach to the notion of “planned misery”, which according to Marks does 
not necessarily entail deliberately inflicted misery (though it can) but rather refers to “misery 
that belongs with[in] the logic of particular socio-economic arrangements.”3 The author finds 
that the foreign investment protection regime can be understood as being part of such a 
“particular socio-economic arrangement” which eventually causes human rights abuses. This 
perception is reinforced by investment protection’ capacity to obstruct and limit host state’s 
possibilities of (progressively) implementing economic, social and cultural human rights for 
their citizens. This especially concerns the developing countries of the global South. Their 
recent history of socio-economic (and political) struggles cannot be completely understood 
without addressing the wider historical context of colonial exploitation, that laid the 
foundations for many of these countries’ hardships.  
This is why the thesis includes a short analysis of the intellectual foundations that helped 
justify European colonial imperialism: Enlightenment and the ideas of development and 
infinite progress. These 18th century Enlightenment paradigms, which were racially and 
culturally biased against non-European societies, are still permeating today’s discourses of 
“development” and the global South in general. To support this claim, the thesis will try to 
establish some form of “genealogy” of these ideas that have influenced Europe’s (and the 
global North’s) discourse of the global South for the last three centuries until today. 
Engaging with the historical (and thus colonial) roots of international law, and especially 
international foreign investment protection, aims at highlighting that these norms were created 
to fulfil a specific purpose: the establishment and preservation of European (economic) 
dominance. 
                                                 
1 Susan Marks, ‘Human Rights and Root Causes’, Modern Law Review, no. Issue 1 (2011): 57–78. 
2 Ibid.: 74. 
3 Ibid.: 75. 
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While the focus of this analysis is on the global North’s actions, it should not be misconstrued 
or misinterpreted as a general acquittal of global South leaders’ wrongful acts that sometimes 
facilitated and exacerbated the effects of the colonisers. 
Being aware that it is beyond the scope of this thesis to fully engage with all the issues raised 
(and even less so with those solely implied), it seekst to contribute by outlining how the former 
colonising countries of Europe largely contributed to the creation of what is known today as 
the “Third World”. This was not a “necessary” or “natural” course of development but 
happened through material exploitation on the one hand and discursive dominance on the 
other – always asserting that European insights and culture were the pinnacle of humanity. 
Echoes of this can still be found in the assertion of “Western-style” models of reshaping of 
global South countries’ economy, agriculture and cultural institutions. 
The thesis is structured as follows: 
Chapter 1 briefly formulates the methodological approaches used in this thesis. 
Chapter 2 will address the ideas of “progress” and “human development” that have been 
brought forward by (liberal) European thinkers from the 18th century onwards. One might 
rightfully ask, how this is important in the context of this thesis and what this has got to do 
with investment law and human rights. The aim of this chapter is to establish that the 
concepts that have been elaborated during that time and which have been used in order to 
justify colonial rule, enslavement, land grabbing and so forth, still inform today’s discourse 
even though they have been modified. 
Chapter 3 will take a look at the “creation of the Third World”. This is important in order to 
better understand the current situation and difficulties of former colonies. While today’s 
foreign investment is often justified as a necessity in order to help countries from the global 
South in their “development”, capital-exporting states from the global North rarely seem to ask 
themselves why these countries are in need of development aid in the first place. To better 
understand this, the first section of this chapter will look at accounts of coercion and material 
exploitation that the colonies and protectorates had to suffer. The second section will look at 
how what we know as the “Third World” today has been rendered poor through the discourse 
that surrounded former colonies after the second World War. This definition of the global 
South as economically poor laid the foundation for the claim that foreign investment and 
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privatisations were these countries’ best chance of escaping poverty. 
Chapter 4 will take a look at foreign investment protection law’s colonial roots. This means 
addressing the role that corporations have had in the colonial venture and exposing how 
practices established in this context have influenced today’s foreign investment protection 
regime. It will furthermore look at global South resistance to these standards, through the 
invention and application of the Calve Doctrine and Clause. 
Chapter 5 is going to engage with the question of how today’s foreign investment protection 
regime is influencing states’ obligations to fulfil their economic, social and cultural rights. 
Selected cases will be analysed in order to support this claim. The aim is to highlight that the 
current foreign investment protection regime, with its bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and 
arbitration system, is set up to clash with the government of developing states that seek to 
fulfil their economic, social and cultural rights. 
The conclusion will conclude this thesis. 
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 1  Methodology 
The following is a hermeneutic thesis that mainly draws its analytical approach from three 
disciplines. These include sociology, Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), 
and critical discourse analysis (CDA). Why these three disciplines? 
Sociological approaches to law challenge the general assumption that the law is objective and 
free from power relations or (political) interests. On the contrary, some sociological scholars 
argue that law itself is a socially constructed phenomenon which is “shaped by social 
conditions, including who makes the law […].”4  Utilising sociology to look at law can 
eventually help to look behind its presumed objectivity and help carve out the drivers that 
have led to their establishment. One of the perspectives that has come out of the sociological 
approach to law (domestic and international) has been the so-called “social-conflict 
approach”. This approach assumes that there exists a constant inequality when it comes to 
the distribution of resources in society and that this uneven distribution leads to struggle 
between the different parties.5 Based on this assumption, law is seen as resource that is 
being used by the dominant groups in order to maintain social structures that privilege them 
and to consolidate the status quo.6 While some sociologists argue that the social-conflict 
perspective emphasises the fragility of the social structure and disorder,7 findings of this 
perspective can in fact become important components in the creation of a more inclusive and 
therefore more stable social structure. 
A critical approach to law which is highlighting international law’s inherent power structures 
and aims at the creation of a more inclusive international legal regime is the Third World 
Approach to International Law (TWAIL). TWAIL is based upon the premise that international 
law is not apolitical, as legal positivists would have it, but was essential to the European 
                                                 
4 Charlotte Ku, ‘Understanding How Law Functions’, ed. Adriana Sinclair, International Studies Review 14, no. 1 
(2012): 188. 
5 Moshe Hirsch, ‘The Sociology of International Law: Invitation to Study International Rules in Their Social 
Context’, The University of Toronto Law Journal 55, no. 4 (2005): 906. 
6 Ibid. 
7 George Ritzer and Douglas J. Goodman, Modern Sociological Theory, 6th ed (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004), 
119–20; Richard Münch, Sociological Theory (Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1994), 189–90. 
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imperial expansion which eventually subordinated, dominated and exploited non-European 
societies.8 According to Mutua’s seminal article “What is TWAIL?”, the discipline is driven by 
the following three interrelated main objectives. 
Firstly, TWAIL engages with international law in order to “deconstruct, understand and unpack 
the uses of international law as a medium for the creation and perpetuation of a racialized 
[sic] hierarchy of international norms and institutions that subordinate non-Europeans to 
Europeans.”9 Secondly, it seeks to establish and work towards an “alternative normative legal 
edifice for international governance”10, in order to eventually reconcile those traditionally 
excluded by international law (its “Others”) with its practice.11 Thirdly, TWAIL also 
understands itself to be political, as it seeks to harness its scholarship and policy to eradicate 
the conditions that keep countries from the global South from exploiting their full potential.12  
Despite TWAIL’s critique of the current international legal order it does not wish to completely 
abandon it. Through its engagement with international law in a manner that brings the 
historical reality of colonialism and its aftermath to the fore, it creates a space in which 
colonialism’s effects can be scrutinised in order to overcome them. Eventually, the aim is to 
have an international legal order that is egalitarian and truly universal, and not just a 
“globalised Eurocentric” legal framework. In order to achieve this goal, international law has to 
accommodate the voices of the global South into its discourse. 
The last method that will feature prominently in this thesis is critical discourse analysis (CDA). 
This approach will be especially important when it comes to analysis of the concepts of 
development as “human progress” and the modern discourse of development as “alleviation 
                                                 
8 Makau Mutua and Antony Anghie, ‘What Is TWAIL?’, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of 
International Law) 94 (2000): 31. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Luis Eslava and Sundhya Pahuja, ‘Beyond the (Post)Colonial: TWAIL and the Everyday Life of International 
Law’, Verfassung Und Recht in Übersee / Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America 45, no. 2 (2012): 
195; James Thuo Gathii, ‘TWAIL: A Brief History of Its Origins, Its Decentralized Network, and a Tentative 
Bibliography Special Issue: Third World Approaches to International Law’, Trade, Law and Development, no. 1 
(2011): 43. 
12 Mutua and Anghie, ‘What Is TWAIL?’, 31; Luis Eslava and Sundhya Pahuja, ‘Beyond the (Post)Colonial’, 195. 
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of poverty”. Like TWAIL, CDA draws from sociological insights13 when it concerns itself with 
the study of relationships of dominance, power, control and discrimination in the structures of 
language.14 CDA assumes that discourse is constitutive of the social and also socially 
conditioned.15 This is why it is looking at the social and political impact that language has and 
at who is able to actively participate and contribute to discourses.16 Consequently, it also 
analyses who is on the receiving end of these effects, without sufficient means to engage in 
the discourse, and therefore “passive”. Since those who are able to participate in and 
determine the contents of the discourse are in a position of power, CDA looks at the role that 
discourse can have on the production, re-production, and challenge of this dominance.17 
Dominance, in this context, is to be understood as “the exercise of social power by elites, 
institutions or groups, that results in social inequality, including political, cultural, class, ethnic, 
racial, and gender inequality.”18 One can already see the similarities that this approach shares 
with TWAIL, as both are concerned with the narratives and matters of those usually left out of 
the creative process – law’s and society’s “Others” – and both are not shying away from 
merging their scholarship and research with political aims of social change and inclusion.19 
Given CDA’s preoccupation with social dominance and social power, it highlights that power 
does not only have to take on the form of recourse to force but that it can also be more subtle, 
as is the case with “cognitive power”. Exercising cognitive power generally takes on the form 
of “persuasion, dissimulation or manupulation, among other strategic ways to change the 
mind of others in one’s own interest [original emphasis].”20 This is where CDA seeks to 
engage because these actions are dependent on written and spoken words that will often try 
to conceal the inherent power relations and attempt to make the dominance appear 
                                                 
13 Jan Blommaert and Chris Bulcaen, ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’, Annual Review of Anthropology 29 (2000): 451. 
14 Ibid.: 448. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Teun A. van Dijk, ‘Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis’, Discourse & Society 4, no. 2 (1993): 249. 
18 Ibid.: 249-50. 
19 Ibid.: 252. 
20 Ibid.: 254. 
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“natural”.21 This naturalisation of power structures and dominance has been an ever-present 
theme and cornerstone in the European justification of the imperial colonialism from the 18th 
century onwards until the 20th century.  
                                                 
21 van Dijk, ‘Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis’, 254. 
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 2  A short Genealogy of the concept of Development 
This chapter takes a look at 18th and 19th century European intellectuals’ development 
theories and theories of linear historical progress, and traces how they have been turned into 
conceptions of European supremacy. It is relevant to analyse development theories because 
“the conception of universal history as the ever-advancing development of human capacities 
has been fundamental to both the self-understanding of the modern West and its view of its 
relations to the rest of the world.”22 By doing so this chapter attempts to show that the 
underlying concepts, which were eventually also used to justify imperial-colonial rule, still 
have an impact on today’s understanding of “development” and international relations in 
general.  
While the main aim here is not to generally discredit the Enlightenment, an effort will be made 
to draw attention to Enlightenment’s “Others” and its interaction with Europe’s imperial 
ambitions. Engaging with this school of thought’s underbelly will eventually bring forth 
prominent figures of the Enlightenment era who asserted that it was the European’s duty to lift 
the allegedly “savage” people of the newly conquered colonies up. 
Early Christianity’s renunciation of the then-prevalent circular understanding of history23 
rendered possible a linear view of history, which was the necessary base for the advent and 
following dominance of the ideology of progress that took hold by the end of the 17th 
century.24 Despite the fact that “development” (and growth) has been an integral part in the 
Western tradition, it has been accompanied by a sense of a limit and ensuing decline. In 
Greek tradition, the limit of growth was assured by the ensuing decay and due to its circular 
understanding of history, there was an expected return of the same. Early Christianity’s turn 
towards a linear conception still kept the concept of development in check, as there was an 
                                                 
22 Thomas McCarthy, Race, Empire, and the Idea of Human Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), 1. 
23 This understanding was mainly influenced by Aristotle’s theory of the cyclical character of nature. He argued that 
birth, growth and decay were stages in a perpetual series of new beginnings, thus allowing for change and the 
return of the same to exist at the same time. See Gilbert Rist, The History of Development: From Western 
Origins to Global Faith, 3rd ed (London: Zed, 2010), 31–32. 
24 Rist, 34. 
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ever-present awareness of a necessary decline after the optimum had been reached.25 These 
barriers were eventually overcome by the beginning of the 18th century26 and the concept of 
development as “human progress” eventually became intrinsically connected with 
Enlightenment thinking.27  
Scottish Enlightenment philosopher Adam Smith was one of the first to provide an early 
model of an elaborated societal development framework.28 Since his work provided the 
foundation for subsequent conceptions, it deserves particular attention. Contrary to most of 
his contemporaries and successors, Smith’s analysis of non-European societies was quite 
tolerant and cautiously avoided assuming European superiority with regards to culture and 
morals.29 Surprisingly, Smith did not morally rank societies and did not use his theory to 
support Europe’s colonial expansion.30 There was, however, a ranking of societies on a socio-
economic basis that depicted European commercial societies as most developed.31 Given 
that his analysis did not lead him to make moral judgments or pejorative assumptions about 
the societies that were in an earlier stage of development, political science scholar Pitts 
argues that his approach to non-European societies was a benign one.32 Smith’s 
legacy,however, the categories and historical arguments that supported his work, eventually 
became the blueprint for later theories that justified colonial expansion based on the claim 
that it was Europe’s duty to “civilise” the “backward” societies.  
These subsequent 19th century theories of “progress” and (human) development were not as 
benign as those of the 18th century, exemplified by Smith, in part because of their generally 
disparaging attitude towards societies that they deemed on a lower stage of development.  
                                                 
25 Rist, 37. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Elizabeth A. Pritchard, ‘The Way out West: Development and the Rhetoric of Mobility in Postmodern Feminist 
Theory’, Hypatia 15, no. 3 (2000): 48. 
28 Jennifer Pitts, A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
Unversity Press, 2005), 25. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid.: 26. 
32 Ibid.: 25-26. 
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This attitude was further reinforced by the emergence of “social evolutionism”, which “firmly 
rooted in the popular imagination the supposed superiority of the West over other societies.”33 
One of the theory’s most important representatives is Herbert Spencer, who coined the 
phrase “survival of the fittest”.34 
According to Spencer’s “law of growing complexity”, living organisms, much like social 
organisms, pass from a homogeneous to a heterogeneous state and from lower and formless 
to higher, more complex states.35 Accordingly, he presumed non-European societies to 
represent the lower stages, while Europeans accounted for the more complex stages of 
humanity.36 This combination of social theory with natural science exemplifies another 
important shift in the development paradigm as it tries to assert that socially created relations 
of power are in fact to be found in nature itself.37 
While there were different interpretations as to what the specific stages were that societies 
had to go through in order to be considered “civilised”, there seemed to be agreement on 
crucial points. One of these was that societies other than European ones could not possibly 
develop at the same speed as the former, which gave Europe a clear lead.38 European 
countries based their “indisputable lead” on the greater size of production (courtesy of colonial 
exploitation), its strong emphasis on reason (which was also used to exclude women from the 
public/political realm) and its scientific and technological discoveries.  
According to development scholar Rist, one of social evolutionism’s effects on a theoretical 
level were that non-European societies were no longer considered for themselves but merely 
became a reference point for Western society and Western society became the unattainable 
goal that these countries had to develop towards.39 Reducing the colonised peoples to points 
of reference also deprived them of their own history and culture, which J. S. Mill, among 
                                                 
33 Rist, The History of Development, 40. 
34 Ibid.: 42. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid.: 44. 
38 Ibid.: 40. 
39 Ibid.: 43. 
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others, expressed in assertions like the following: “The greater part of the world has, properly 
speaking, no history […].”40 
On a political level, the rise of social evolutionism has served as a legitimate justification for 
the increasing colonial ventures in the 19th century. Hailing from its ostensible position of 
superiority, Europe styled itself as generous coloniser, “helping” so-called “backward” 
countries to reach their developmental potential.41 Violence was an acceptable means to this 
end, which J.S. Mills notoriously proclaimed as follows: “Despotism is a legitimate mode of 
government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the 
means justified by actually effecting that end.”42 
Even critics of European colonialism and imperial conquest like Adam Smith, Jeremy 
Bentham, Immanuel Kant and the Marquis de Condorcet43 still understood non-Europeans to 
be on a lesser stage of development. This led to assumptions of non-Europeans being unable 
to make full use of their capacities and in need of tutelage, as French intellectual Condorcet 
highlighted by claiming that “these vast lands […] need only assistance from us to become 
civilised [and] wait only to find brothers amongst the European nations to become their friends 
and pupils”.44 One could actually already conceive of this as a precursor to the modern 
concept of “development aid”. 
Considering the views on development elaborated by former UK prime minister Tony Blair in 
his 2013 speech “From Dependency to Self-Sufficiency”, one can find a similar theme 
emerging. According to him “aid will remain important to Africa in certain circumstances [and] 
we in the developed world must shift our focus to building the capacity of African governments 
to take their destiny into their own hands, to keep expanding their economies, and to ensure 
                                                 
40 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, ed. David Bromwich and George Kateb (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 2003), 135. 
41 Rist, The History of Development, 43. 
42 Mill, On Liberty, 81. 
43 Pitts, A Turn to Empire, 5; Rist, The History of Development, 39. 
44 Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat Condorcet, Sketch for a historical picture of the progress of the human mind, 
Library of ideas (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1955), 177. 
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that the benefits of growth reach all people.”45 While it can be argued that his main concern is 
to see African governments become more stable and independent46, the similarities to 
Condorcet’s quote are visible. Like the former, he does not question the fact that it will be 
thanks to Western support and capacity building that these countries will develop, making the 
peoples of Africa Europe’s “friends” and more importantly, its “pupils”. This again echoes the 
prominent 19th century assumption that non-European societies were child-like, incapable of 
using their full rational capacities, and therefore in need of tutelage by the European 
colonisers.47  
While there are many more examples like this that could be analysed, it is beyond this thesis 
to do so, as this section is mainly concerned with giving the reader a general understanding of 
how the 18th century concepts of development (and its imperial connotations) are still present 
today. This causes Rist to proclaim that “‘Development co-operation’ […] comes in a straight 
line from the ideology of the Enlightenment”.48  
Why is all of this relevant in the context of foreign investment protection laws? It is important 
to consider the history of developmental thought because these ideas also informed the 
generation of international law during the colonial era. Europe’s assumption of superiority led 
to its exclusion of other voices that could have informed international law, and the imposition 
of standards that were favourable for the colonising countries. A prominent example of this 
attitude can again be found in J.S. Mill. He argued that “reciprocity, mutual respect for 
sovereignty, and the law of nations should govern relations among civilized nations, while 
relations between civilized nations and “barbarians” cannot, properly speaking, be considered 
political relations.”49 
Even though some of these laws eventually did become “international” law, it can be argued 
that the supposedly universalism of these laws is a “particularistic” one. Latour describes the 
                                                 
45 Tony Blair and Kate Gross, ‘From Dependency to Self-Sufficiency (SSIR)’, accessed 11 August 2019, 
https://ssir.org/articles/entry/from_dependency_to_self_sufficiency. 
46 While he is addressing these issues, he is not considering the possible impacts that Britain’s colonial rule and 
British economic interests in the region have had on some of these governments. See Rist (n20): 74. 
47 Thomas McCarthy, Race, Empire, and the Idea of Human Development: 76. 
48 Rist, The History of Development: 39. 
49 Pitts, A Turn to Empire: 143. 
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phenomenon of a so-called “particular universalism” as “one society extend[ing] to all others 
the historically constructed values in which it believes.”50 
 
 3  The Making of the 3rd World 
This chapter will challenge assumptions that the current state of global South countries has 
been an inevitable “natural development” by highlighting some of the external factors that 
have caused this development and partly continue to do so. Doing so, the analysis will draw 
from Marks concept and understanding of “planned misery”, outlining how colonialism has 
created the foundations for a “particular socio-economic arrangement” that promotes 
“misery”.51 It will also take a twist on Fanon’s realisation that Europe, due to its exploitation of 
raw materials in the colonies, is actually a product of the so-called Third World.52 By 
implication, this could also mean that the Third World is a product of Europe, if one 
considered this to be the other side of the same coin.  
While it is important to consider external factors that have led to some of the current 
difficulties that countries from the global South are facing, this thesis is not trying to deny or 
condone the wrongdoings on the part of global South leadership, that have eventually 
exacerbated some of these detrimental effects. It is, however, beyond the scope of this 
analysis, to address these factors as well. 
The first section of this chapter is going to look at how material exploitation by the colonising 
powers has affected the former colonies and left them with an economic disadvantage as 
soon as they became sovereign states. This disadvantage eventually manifested itself in a 
limited or no control over natural resources, borders, and accession to contracts, just to 
mention a few.  
The concessions that European corporations have been granted in order to exploit the natural 
resources of colonies have often been acquired by use of force (“gunboat diplomacy”) or due 
to the signatories’ lack of understanding and still affect some of these countries today. The 
                                                 
50 Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1993): 105. 
51 Marks, ‘Human Rights and Root Causes’, 75. 
52 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, trans. Constance Farrington (New York: Grove Press, 1963), 102. 
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raw materials from the colonies consequently fuelled Europe’s ascension and growing 
industry at the expense of the former, discouraging the emergence of national industries. 
The second section is going to look at the dynamics of power within the discourse 
surrounding the Third World. While global North countries have not only dominated this 
discourse in their own hemisphere, hardly incorporating global South voices, they have also 
impacted the discourse in the global South, eventually affecting the self-perception of these 
peoples. The concept of “development” again features prominently in this context but with a 
different meaning. After the second World War, countries in the global South have become to 
be known as “underdeveloped” and the term “development” underwent two major changes. 
On the one hand it became a transitive concept, which meant that it became “an action [that 
could be] performed by one agent upon another”53 and alongside this change, it was mainly 
understood as “reduction of poverty”. Consequently, the framing of two thirds of the world as 
(econonomically) “underdeveloped” also transformed its inhabitants to “poor peoples”. 
Conceiving of poverty as an economic problem and establishing annual per capita income as 
its new unit of measurement called for economic growth as the problem’s solution. 
 
3.1. The Making of the 3rd World through material Exploitation 
This section is going to give the reader a short overview of the material exploitation that 
former colonies and other non-European countries have been subjected to. This is important 
in order to better understand why these countries are considered “less developed”, 
“developing” or “underdeveloped”. 
While colonialism might have had various effects on those subjected to it and the alleged 
“civilisation” and development of non-European peoples had been used as a justification at 
home, it should be highlighted that European powers were aiming at the exploitation of 
colonial resources in order to generate a massive transfer of wealth from the periphery to the 
home countries.54 
                                                 
53 Rist, The History of Development, 73. 
54 Toyin Falola, ‘Colonial Administrations and the Africans’, in The Palgrave Handbook of African Colonial and 
Postcolonial History, ed. Martin S. Shanguhyia and Toyin Falola (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2018), 93; 
Alice L. Conklin, ‘Colonialism and Human Rights, A Contradiction in Terms? The Case of France and West 
Africa, 1895-1914’, The American Historical Review 103, no. 2 (1998): 420; Kenneth Kalu and Toyin Falola, 
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Rodney, looking at the reasons for Africa’s underdevelopment, constitutes that colonial Africa 
had been embedded in the international capitalist economy as a provider of surplus value to 
fuel the mother countries. Echoing Fanon’s realisation of Europe being the product of the 
Third World, he finds that “[i]t meant the development of Europe as part of the same 
dialectical process in which Africa was underdeveloped.”55  
The agricultural sector played an important role in Africa’s colonial exploitation, with some 
claiming that it was the most important sector in the colonial economic framework. It was an 
important resource in the quest for sustaining Europe’s rapid industrial growth. Foreign firms 
were able to make considerable profits from the export of exotic agricultural products like 
peanuts, cocoa, rubber, coffee, palm oil, and timber, with local farmers being unable to 
market their produce.56 Farmland for the supply of the local population was reduced in order 
to increase the production of cash-crops for export, which eventually led to damage inflicted 
upon the land due to nutrient reduction.57 Aside from the detrimental effects this policy had on 
the soil, this system also created “ a precarious economic structure dependent exclusively on 
the export of natural resources – a disease that continues to define Africa’s economy up to 
the present day.”58 
Apart from the agricultural sector, mining also played an important role in the colonial 
economy. Raw materials that have been exploited included gold, coal, diamonds, tin, copper, 
manganese, and copper. While the African population was mainly used as cheap labour 
force, with limited or no possibilities to unionise, foreign companies that were dominating the 
sector were able to generate massive profits without paying significant amounts of tax.59 
                                                                                                                                            
eds., Exploitation and Misrule in Colonial and Postcolonial Africa (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 
2019), 4. 
55 Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, Rev. ed (Washington, D.C: Howard University Press, 
1981), 149. 
56 Kalu and Falola, Exploitation and Misrule in Colonial and Postcolonial Africa, 5. 
57 Falola, ‘Colonial Administrations and the Africans’, 94. 
58 Kalu and Falola, Exploitation and Misrule in Colonial and Postcolonial Africa, 6. 
59 Ibid.; As a recent report by Oxfam and Tax Justice Network Australia has uncovered, Australian mining 
companies are found to have transferred AUD $ 1.1 billion out of Africa thanks to tax evasion. This exemplifies a 
clear continuation of profit maximisation with techniques established during direct colonial rule. See ‘Buried 
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In addition to these grim examples on one-sided benefits, colonial rulers also suppressed the 
emergence of national industries that could threaten those in the home countries.60 
One can easily imagine that if trade and the exploitation of natural resources had been 
administered on equal footing for the European and non-European parties, it could actually 
have been beneficial for non-European peoples and they could have developed in a way that 
they might have seen fit, without foreign imposition.  
Hari Sharan Chhabra dares to make such an assumption, declaring that “[l]eft to itself, Angola 
today would have been an economic giant dictating terms to world powers.”61 This statement 
is supported by the fact that Angola has very fertile soil and tropical climate, which would 
make it suitable for agricultural undertakings. Despite listing extensive natural resources, 
among them oil and different minerals, Chhabra comes to the conclusion that having been 
exposed to colonial rule, “the discovery of these riches was in no way calculated to further 
native interests […].”62 While this analysis focuses on Angola, similar examples can be found 
in other African countries or on other continents that have experienced colonial subjugation. 
While accounts of different peoples subduing each other can be found throughout history long 
before colonialism, the colonial venture introduced a novelty: exploitation of one country by 
another one on a grand scale.63  
As mentioned earlier, this extraction and transfer of value towards the European colonisers 
did not only befall Africa but began as early as the Spaniards set foot on the American 
continent. Due to their horses, gunpowder and the (inadvertent) introduction of smallpox to 
the continent, the Spaniards had a major advantage and soon exterminated the Aztec and 
Inca empires. This laid the foundation for forced labour in silver mines on a grand scale and 
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the production and transfer of 51,100 metric tons of silver to Spain, between the 1493 and 
1700. According to estimates, this made up 81 per cent of the world stock of silver in 1700.64 
Due to the sweeping effects of the drastic and violent decimation of native American 
population, another major exploitative concept of colonial rule came to fruition: the slave 
trade. Ironically, the silver obtained from the American continent provided the payment for 
African slaves that were forcibly transferred over the Atlantic via an Indian detour. This means 
that in order to pay the collaborative African slave-hunters, colonial powers used cotton 
textiles which they bought from India with the silver from the Americas – thus, an elaborate 
global system had been established.65 Kalu and Falola conclude that “[s]lavery was and 
perhaps remains the highest form of exploitation” because “Atlantic slave trade devastated 
Africa for several centuries, setting the stage for a culture of exploitation, brute force, 
inequality, subservience, and instability […].”66 
Another significant example of the effects caused by material exploitation due to colonialism 
is the case of India. With the previous paragraph outlining India’s payment in silver, one might 
assume that India actually profited from the global trading network established by Europe’s 
colonial expansion. It did so only in part. India was the largest recipient of silver outside of 
Europe until these payments immediately ended due to the British expanding their presence 
and eventually taking over the country after the Battle of Plassey in 1757.67 Subsequently, 
India, who claimed the global top spot as cotton exporter until the end of the 18th century and 
whose share in the world manufacturing output had been estimated at almost 20 per cent in 
1800, also fell victim to the economic drain of colonialism. Its global share fell to 
approximately 8 per cent in 1860 and to meagre 1.4 per cent in 1913.68 While India’s global 
share was decreasing, British global share increased and further facilitated British 
industrialisation, thanks to its manufactured products that allowed for a seizure of the 
markets. Unable to compete with British production, India’s textile sector eventually de-
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industrialised. The British East India Company even boasted in a petition to the British 
Parliament that “this Company has in various ways, encouraged and assisted by our great 
manufacturing ingenuity and skill, succeeded in converting India from a manufacturing 
country into a country exporting raw produce.”69 These developments wreaked havoc on 
millions of Indians whose livelihood depended on their work in textile industry. Many of them, 
with numbers in the millions, were forced to serve as cheap labour force in slave-like 
conditions in order to work labour intensive plantations and build infrastructures like roads and 
railways in British colonies.70  
These few samples of colonialism’s economic exploitation are not exhaustive and might very 
well have taken different forms in regions that this outline did not touch upon. The main aim of 
this section was to show what the unfettered assumptions of European superiority, as 
described in the previous chapter, have lead to and that the foundation for what has become 
to be known as the Third World has been laid by colonialism. 
While some71 argue that colonial expansion also had its benefits like the end of despotic rule 
and the introduction of things like railways, schools, the rule of law and the like, one might 
answer with post-colonial writer Césaire. In his “Discourse on colonialism”, he argues that all 
of these putative benefits seem to omit all the human suffering, displacements, cultural 
damage and collective trauma caused in order for these “benefits” to be introduced. To 
people who want him to see the positive impact of Europe’s expansion, he answers: “I am 
talking about societies drained of their essence, cultures trampled underfoot, institutions 
undermined, lands confiscated, religions smashed, magnificent artistic creations destroyed, 
extraordinary possibilities wiped out [original emphasis].”72 
It has become clear that colonial rule aimed at advancing European economic interests by 
exploiting the colonies’ natural resources, creating new markets for Europe’s thriving 
industries and to provide revenues. This agenda disrupted the native ways of life and 
developmental processes and created the foundation for a socio-economic environment that 
would make self-reliant development basically impossible and foster misery. 
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Being very well aware of the material exploitation that colonialism caused and that Europe’s 
fledging industries and its societies had benefited immensely from it, Fanon took to criticise 
the smug portrayal of “help” in the form of “development aid” and the like. He declares that 
“when we hear the head of a European state declare with his hand on his heart that he must 
come to the aid of the poor underdeveloped peoples, we do not tremble with gratitude”73 and 
explains it should rather be considered a “just reparation” that will be paid to the countries that 
have been subjected to colonialism. As a consequence of his understanding, he does not 
want these countries to understand aid as a generous and charitable gesture by the 
European countries and stresses the point that colonised peoples are rightly entitled to it and 
that it is the colonisers’ duty to pay. Eventually, he rejects the concept of “development” that 
Europe propagated from the 18th century onwards and refuses to “catch up” with anyone, 
calling for new concepts that do not rely on European influence and conditions but still allow 
for a respectful coexistence.  
One could argue that what Fanon has put forward in his “Wretched of the Earth” is, among 
many other things, a challenge to the dominant discourse concerning the misery in global 
South countries and how to encounter it. The following section is going to outline how the 
global North’s post-WWII discourse has made poverty the distinctive feature of the Third 
World. 
 
3.2. The discursive rendering of the 3rd World as poor 
While the previous section focused on the material conditions that have facilitated the birth of 
what has been referred to as the Third World, this section will address the discursive 
conditions that made this possible. By doing so, it will explain how the term “Third World” 
came about and how the regions associated with it have been portrayed as poor and in need 
of the global North’s help in order to escape their misery. Such an inquiry is important in order 
to obtain a better understanding of the context in which foreign investment protection has 
been operating in since WWII. The previously expounded concept of development and the 
aftermath of the colonial exploitation will also feature throughout this analysis. 
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After the former European colonies obtained their independence, some of the emerging 
governments failed to undo the governance structures that had been established by the 
colonisers and thus denied real political change for the majority of the people. This meant that 
the political independence rather bestowed the instruments of power and exploitation, put in 
place and abandoned by the European colonial officers, on the new leaders. So for many 
exploitation did not end, as rulers took to more violent forms of control in order to contain the 
citizens that demanded actual change.74 Kalu and Falola conclude that it was this failure to 
provide real change and social transformation “that [caused] Africa [to be] […] associated with 
several disparaging labels that currently dominate discourse on the continent in the 
international arena— poverty, underdevelopment, diseases, corruption, and foreign aid.”75 
While the focus in their analysis is on Africa, similar cases of local elites using the exploitative 
structures established by colonialism can be found throughout former colonies. Their analysis 
also points to another relevant issue, namely the association of African countries (again, other 
countries subjected to colonial rule may be substituted) with underdevelopment, poverty and 
foreign aid. Poverty has become one of the main features for most of the former colonies, 
which after WWII collectively became known as the “Third World”. 
While many might have a vague understanding of what the term “Third World” refers to, few 
might now how it came into existence. Unsurprisingly, the concept of development played a 
role in this ranking, though an implicit one. The main criteria for the distinction of the First and 
the Second Worlds was considered to be the economic framework. The First World, formed 
by the United States of America and Western and Central European countries, committed 
itself to partly regulated market capitalism. The Second World, on the other hand, rejected 
this model and instead relied on a governmental-regulated market, also known as socialist 
planning. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) has been associated with this 
socio-economic approach.76 These two world, however, did not encompass all of the globe. In 
fact, they did not even contain its majority, as both combined only comprised a third of the 
global population. The rest, which French anti-colonial writer Sauvy called the “ignored, 
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exploited, scorned […]”77, constituted the Third World. Sauvy used this term as a reference to 
the French Third Estate. Prior to the French Revolution in 1789, the monarchy’s counsellors 
were divided into the First Estate, representing the clergy, and the Second Estate, 
representing the aristocracy, and the Third Estate, comprised of the bourgeoisie.78 During the 
Revolution, the Third Estate claimed the name of the National Assembly, inviting the popular 
masses to be its sovereign.79 Sauvy saw the Third World as possessing the political potential 
to create unity and leave its mark on world affairs. 
Focussing on the element of poverty, anthropologist Escobar observes that it was only after 
WWII that poverty on a global scale was discovered.80 Before the war broke out, the 
treatment and conception of poverty in the global South was quite different inasmuch as the 
concern with poverty in colonial times was not a substantial one. Colonial administrators 
assumed that “even if ‘natives’ could be somewhat enlightened by the presence of the 
colonizer [sic], not much could be done about their poverty because their economic 
development was pointless” as their “capacity for science and technology, the basis for 
economic progress, was seen as nil.”81 While poverty in the former colonies only emerged as 
a global concern after WWII, it has of course existed previously and also well before Europe’s 
colonial expansion. Rahnema, however, points out that the social relations of those 
considered “poor” and the rest of the society were of a different kind before the societies of 
the Third World experienced colonial exploitation and the imposition of colonial governance 
structures. Without a view to idealise traditional and native approaches to poverty, he finds 
that they better integrated the poor in the social network and that they were considered to be 
a part of society and not an issue that one had to get rid of. Contrary to what one might 
assume, they were considered to be somewhat respectable members of society who just 
happened to be in danger of losing or had already lost their abode. Being an integral part of 
communities, they were generally also provided for by the latter, making external or 
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institutionalised assistance obsolete except for cases of general catastrophes (e.g. natural 
disasters like floods, or other disasters like famine or war).82 Both Escobar and Rahnema 
conclude that the breakdown of these community ties and self-reliant ways of communal 
organisation by the introduction of the market economy deprived millions of people from 
access to essential resources like land or water and thus marked the beginning of modern 
mass poverty. With social bonds dissolving, the impoverished were eventually contingent on 
external institutional assistance.83 
Within the logic of market economy, the poor were those that lacked the money and material 
possessions of the rich and the poor countries thus were those that had not attained the 
wealth of countries that were economically more advanced. Once again, the European 
development-paradigm had been applied, with the western and central European countries 
and the U.S.A. exemplifying the pinnacle of development that other countries had to catch up 
on. This time, however, those deemed less developed were not “barbaric” and in need of a 
“civilising process”, on the contrary, they were now part of the same sphere.84 Being part of 
the same framework allowed them to hope that they could eventually catch up, if they played 
by the established rules. Having redefined development in economical terms, economic 
growth seemed the only reasonable means to counteract this situation, with annual per capita 
income being the ideal yardstick. This caused the perception of the global scale of poverty to 
become a comparative statistical operation, which had been inaugurated in 1940.85  
This approach, again excluded the historical causes for the newly discovered poverty and 
took the state of affairs from the moment former colonies gained independence as starting 
point point of the observations. With the newly independent countries embedded in the 
economic development paradigm, and the assumption that the rules for the internal, self-
dynamising process of development were the same for everyone, historical explanations for 
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why some countries were “more developed” were effectively omitted.86 Rodley points out this 
omission when he states that “statistics which show that Africa today is underdeveloped are 
the statistics representing the state of affairs at the end of colonialism.”87  
Another tool that helped shape the discourse surrounding global South countries in economic 
and ahistorical terms was the World Bank’s 1948 proclamation that countries whose annual 
per capita income did not exceed $100 were to be considered poor.88 Again, this yardstick by 
itself can only reveal so much. Again, Rodney’s above-mentioned statement that what this 
figure does show is the result of decades and even centuries of colonial governance and 
exploitation serves as a reminder to question the seemingly ahistorical data.  As already 
established in the previous section, colonialism was an economic venture that was tailored 
only to the benefits of the colonisers and aimed at furthering their own development. Rodney 
describes at length how those subjected to colonial rule were forced to work under dire 
conditions for free or such low wages that only a minimum investment of European capital 
was required in order to generate a high yield in profits.89 With colonial corporations 
controlling the prices for the raw materials as well as the prices for the imported goods from 
the metropoles and passing on the costs of reduced prices on the global market on to the 
peasants, they kept their earnings ever so meagre. With the little they have had left, taxes 
had to be paid, which the colonial masters collected in an attempt to keep the colonies self-
sufficient.90 Those that were not in need of paid labour because they could sustain 
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themselves with their land and the selling of live stock,91 must of course appear “poor” when 
measured with a monetary yardstick.  
Once the majority of the world had been declared poor and little thought had been given to 
the historical relations that caused the global North to be economically more developed, new 
discourses and practices dealing with this problem were brought into existence.92 Economic 
development and economic assistance for Third World countries has become one of the most 
prominent and pervasive practices in that context. In his seminal “Encountering Development” 
Escobar outlines the first ever economic mission by the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development to Colombia, whose intent it was to formulate a comprehensive program for 
the country’s development. The report is another example of how the omnipresent discourse 
of “progress”, proposing a Western-style restructuring of the country as the only solution for 
their predicament while portraying these required changes as universally applicable and 
implicitly inevitable. His assessment of the report was that it proposed strategies that were 
mainly means for providing access to countries’ resources and maintaining a hold on them.93  
The development discourse, with its basic premise of modernisation as the necessary tool for 
the overcoming of archaic relations, declared industrialisation and urbanisation as inevitable 
steps on the route to modernisation. No social, political and cultural costs were deemed too 
high in the name of their alleged progress. Thus the use of private capital, foreign as well as 
domestic, was considered to be essential in order to provide for the profound need of capital 
that was needed for the modernisation process. Having classified the countries that were to 
be developed as being “trapped in a ‘vicious circle’ of poverty and lack of capital”,94 domestic 
savings could only provide so much capital. Therefore it was considered that the bulk of the 
necessary capital had to be foreign, with “governments and international organizations [sic] 
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tak[ing] an active role in promoting and orchestrating the necessary efforts to overcome 
general backwardness and economic underdevelopment.”95  
While more on the discourse surrounding the so-called Third World could be said, especially 
about another major talking point like the “population problem”,96 the effects of the discourse 
on those subject to it or their resistance against it, it would be beyond the scope of this thesis 
to do so. The intent of this section was to outline how the designation “Third World” came 
about, the importance of poverty in the discursive creation of the Third World and some of the 
shortcomings of the discourse with regards to the historical conditions that allowed for two 
thirds of the world being considered “poor” in the first place. It is thus important to be aware 
that  
“Inequality, poverty, and underdevelopment do not come about because of inherent 
cosmic imbalances or (only a) lack of efficiency in governance among some peoples 
but because of the continuation or imposition of rules and ideologies ensuring that 
affluent states maintain their dominance over others.”97  
 
With the post-WWII discourse including the former colonies in the same sphere as the former 
colonisers, only “lagging a bit behind”, development was looked at as an internal and self-
generating process, that could, however, be assisted from the outside. With economic growth 
considered the only “logical” solution to the economic backwardness of the global South, 
foreign investment was became imperative. 
The following section is going to take a look at foreign investment and its protection 
framework during the colonial era in an attempt to show its involvement in the “creation” of the 
Third World. 
 
 4  Foreign Investment Protection Law’s colonial Roots 
This chapter will take a look at the colonial roots of today’s foreign investment protection 
framework. While it is often postulated that the emergence of the field of foreign investment 
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protection law is a rather recent and treaty-based phenomenon that started with the signing of 
the first Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) between Germany and Pakistan in 1959,98 this 
chapter argues that practices of foreign investment protection can be traced back to the 
European colonial expansion in the 17th century.99 It is important to consider the history of 
foreign investment protection as it allows for a better understanding of its objectives and 
standards, especially the international minimum standard (IMS) and international dispute 
settlement mechanisms. In addition, this investigation can also help explain why some 
companies from the global North hold assets in the global South, how they have attained 
them and why the export of capital has for a very long time been a one-way street, namely 
from the global North to the global South.  
The first section of this chapter will draw from Anghie’s concept of the “colonial encounter”100 
and its importance for the creation of international legal relations that were not only inter-
European. According to his analysis, the colonial encounter was crucial for Europe’s 
understanding of sovereignty and the necessary criteria for statehood.101 In addition, the 
section is going to outline how European companies, driven by the ideas of progress and 
development, were investing in the newly acquired territories. Once new territories, and 
especially ports, had been acquired, the colonisers would not subject themselves to the local 
legal systems but instead insisted on the application of their own laws, as they were deemed 
“more civilised”. Equipped with a more superior arsenal of military weapons, these colonial 
corporations and subsequently the states themselves were often able to coerce natives into 
concession agreements, a practice that also came to be known as “gunboat diplomacy”. 
The second section is going to take a look at the global South’s reaction to the imposed 
regime of international minimum standards. These standards, which were mostly proposed by 
the majority of global North countries, would seek to circumvent domestic jurisdiction when it 
came to investment disputes settlements. The countries of South America were proposing a 
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mechanisms that would grant foreign investors the same rights as domestic investors, which 
was considered to be an egalitarian approach. These mechanisms became to be known as 
the Calvo Doctrine and the Calvo Clause and their origins and subsequent rediscovery by 
other global South countries will be outlined in this section.  
Dealing with the colonial history foreign investment protection and addressing alternative 
approaches to foreign investment protection are important in order to better assess if the rules 
regulating the protection of foreign investment can legitimately be called “international” or if 
they actually are a form of a “particularistic universality” as explained in a previous chapter.  
 
4.1. Foreign Investment Protection Law and the Colonial Nexus 
This section is first going to take a look at the foreign investment protection within the colonial 
framework, highlighting how the intermingling of corporate and state interests provided 
companies with military and diplomatic power that facilitated access to non-European 
countries in order to open them up for easier trade with the home countries. 
In her in-depth analysis of foreign investment protection law’s history “The Origins of 
International Investment Law”, Kate Miles claims that international investment law’s origins 
are “deeply embedded within the global expansion of European trading and investment 
activities that occurred during the seventeenth to early twentieth centuries.”102  
Outlining the framework that allowed for international investment law to emerge in Europe, 
Miles finds that its origins can be found in reciprocal arrangements between European states. 
Being of relatively equal bargaining power, they tried to establish minimum standards of 
treatment for the nationals that were investing in other countries on the continent that were 
based on reciprocity.103 One of these methods used to regulate and facilitate foreign 
investment and assure adequate treatment of nationals by other states were the so-called 
“friendship, commerce, and navigation treaties”, which have also been considered the 
intellectual forebears of today’s bilateral investment treaties (BITs).104 The use of these 
treaties started in the 18th century and they generally entailed the granting of commercial 
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privileges by both parties, and also dealt with the treatment of the state parties’ nationals.105 
Some of the commercial privileges granted by these treaties included the protection of an 
individual’s property and themselves, freedom of movement, the granting of rights to trade 
and national treatment.106 These treaties thus created a network based on reciprocity, whose 
purpose it was to protect foreign capital. 
While this system was accepted between European powers, the discovery of continents and 
countries that were deemed “uncivilised” changed this concept fundamentally, as the 
application of force and coercion had been considered a legitimate means in relations with 
non-Europeans.107 Miles calls treaties that were concluded in this manner “unequal 
treaties”108, while Anghie refers to them as “capitulation treaties”.109 The main aim of these 
treaties was to open up new territories for European and North American trade and 
investment, regardless of consent or desire. While the language of such treaties tried to 
maintain an aura of legality and neutrality, the fact that they were a product of force and that 
they were often unilaterally imposed in order to secure benefits for traders, states, and 
investors, remained secondary.110 Anghie explains that this attitude had to do with the legal 
positivism of the time, which on the one hand thought of non-Europeans as being outside the 
scope of law and on the other hand could not disregard the treaties entered into by European 
countries and non-European countries. European countries relied on these treaties in order to 
expand their empires, if only for the simple fact that they wanted to avoid disputes over 
colonial territories amongst themselves.111 Faced with this problem, positivist managed to 
neglect the non-European signatories to the treaties despite identifying and giving effect to 
their intent, seemingly at the same time. This was possible by adhering to the positivist 
practice of focusing on the letter of the law while excluding the circumstances that created it. 
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As a consequence of this approach, the violence inflicted upon non-Europeans and their 
resistance to it was seemingly ignored by the legal positivists of the time.112  
These enforced arrangements created non-reciprocal rights like travel prerogatives for the 
foreign traders, the granting of concessions to foreign companies and even governance 
powers, exemplified in the establishment of extraterritorial jurisdiction. This meant that 
European nationals doing business in non-European territories, along with their property, 
remained under the jurisdiction of their home countries and local jurisdiction was thereby 
blatantly circumvented.113 This rejection of local laws was once more justified by a European 
understanding of progress. It was assumed that the local laws were not developed enough to 
deal with the matter and thus inferior to the colonial powers’ bodies of law.114 Having had the 
security of imperial protection, the need for an external system of foreign investment 
protection that was not only an extension of European norms was nonexistent.  
Concessions were another important tool in the context of imperial foreign investment. They 
were usually “concluded between a host state and an individual or company and allowed that 
individual to engage in an activity that had previously been the sole realm of the state.”115 
These instruments generally dealt with the extraction of raw materials or the construction but 
also with public utilities, like railways. Before states officially took part in the expansion of the 
economic and subsequently geographical network, companies like the British East Indian 
Company and the Dutch East India Company were in the vanguard. Declared to be 
extensions of the Crown and thus having acquired elements of legal personality, they were 
capable of asserting sovereign rights over natives, make peace and war with them and coin 
money.116 
Thanks to the concessions, the ones holding them were granted extensive rights like 
jurisdictional control over areas of land or natural resources for long periods of time, in 
exchange for royalty fees whose rates were fixed.117 As a consequence, the concessionaires 
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were able to acquire sovereign powers generally held by a state.118 Concession agreements 
were often established pursuant to unequal treaties and thus frequently involved the 
application of coercive means by global North countries in order to obtain favourable terms for 
their nationals. This trend was increasing as the intra-European competition for access to new 
territories and raw materials gained momentum. The concessions that were acquired in this 
way were then protected by either military force or diplomatic pressure.119 Europe’s expansion 
of trade possibilities and foreign investment had therefore been connected to its imperialist 
and colonial ventures from the outset. 
How did European countries justify these actions?  
As mentioned above, one way of legitimising these actions was the legal positivist approach, 
which held that despite the violence and coercion used to gain access to resources via 
concessions or unequal treaties, the letter of the thus established law had to be respected. It 
was in these interactions with non-European peoples, the so-called “colonial encounter”, that 
the international law used by European countries met its Other and thus actually took shape 
in the process of its application.120 The granting of concessions by non-European peoples can 
provide a suitable example of the inconsistencies and fractures within the emerging 
international legal framework. On the one hand they were denied legal status within 
international law, because they were not “civilised states”, but on the other hand they were 
assumed to be able to dispose of their natural resources via a treaty with European states. If 
they lacked the legal status to do so, one might wonder how they were able to consent in a 
meaningful manner to the concession treaties.121 It seems like this obvious legal gap mattered 
not so much, since the concessions could always be acquired or defended by superior 
military strength and the treaties that were concluded in such a manner also served another 
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purpose: avoiding intra-European fights over non-European possessions.122 While treaties 
were considered to be one possibility of bringing non-Europeans into the sphere of 
international law, though not fully, other methods included colonisation, recognition as a state, 
and protectorate agreements.123 Colonialism simply subjected the colonised to European 
sovereign control, therefore erasing the non-European peoples sovereignty and allowing 
Europeans to exploit resources at their leisure. Recognition as a state or a member of “the 
family of nations” was the exception and granted to states like Japan or former Siam.124 
Protectorate agreements allowed European states to exercise extensive control over non-
European states without having to officialy assume sovereignty over them.125 Three out of 
these four ways of integration into the European version of international law included either 
forceful or diplomatic submission of non-Europeans, or both, for which the imperial apparatus 
provided the necessary tools. This also included the extension of European trade and 
investment rules to other parts of the world. Use of force and manipulation of law doctrines in 
order to acquire economic advantages and commercial benefits were part of international 
investment law’s formation. According to Miles “it is of fundamental importance to the shape 
and character of international investment law that the context in which its principles were 
developed was one of exploitation and imperialism.”126 This had the effect that the laws 
governing international investment heavily favoured the capital-exporting countries and 
eventually only focussed on the protection of the investor and less so on the host countries or 
their population. Having been excluded from the protective measures of international 
investment law, the host countries were unable to call upon it in cases where they had 
suffered damage by the investor.127 The preferential treatment of the investor over host 
countries and their people and their inability to call upon international investment law in cases 
of harm caused to them by the investor are problems that still haunt the discipline today. 
Examining international investment law’s history in light of European colonialism also brought 
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the alignment of state interests and those of private investors to the fore, exemplified by 
companies like the British East India Trading Company or the Dutch East India Trading 
Company.128 
Having looked at some of the historical aspects of international investment law, it might seem 
as if Europe was the only continent that was concerned with regulating commercial relations 
and brought these ideas to non-European countries. This, however, is not accurate, as pre-
colonial trading systems and regulations have existed in Asia, Africa and the Middle East and 
Miles argues that the spread of Europe’s version would indeed not have been possible 
without pre-existing systems.129 While non-Europeans certainly tried to resist the imposition of 
European laws that, while seemingly neutral, favoured only the latter, they eventually were 
subdued by Europe’s military strength.130 The acts of resistance, however, showed a clear 
rejection of these principles and raise the question of how “international” these laws actually 
were and continue to be. Keeping the history of their dissemination in mind, one might rather 
refer to them as “globalised European laws”.  
Resistance to international investment norms that favoured the investor to the detriment of the 
host country and its population did continue and found another expression in the now famous 
Calvo Doctrine and Calvo Principle. These legal instruments challenged the notion that 
foreign investors should be afforded a higher standard of protection than domestic investors. 
The region that first comprehensibly formulated and championed these principles was South 
America. The next section will deal with the history the Calvo Doctrine and Clause and its 
challenge of the international minimum standard. 
 
4.2. The Calvo Doctrine and Clause 
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The Calvo Doctrine and Clause emerged out of legal disputes between European and North 
American investors and South American host states.131 These disputes mainly concerned the 
security and treatment of foreign investors and their assets by the authorities of the host state. 
To better understand how the disputes came about, the diplomatic protection of aliens and its 
influence on the foreign investment protection laws of the 19th century should be considered.  
Diplomatic protection of aliens initially concerned itself with the protection of nationals that 
were living in countries where diplomatic missions were assigned to and subsequently also 
concerned itself with their property.132 Attached to the diplomatic protection was an 
understanding that an international minimum standard regarding the treatment of aliens, 
including companies, and their property existed.133 This right to protect their own nationals 
abroad through diplomatic protection was generally asserted by capital-exporting countries, 
based on the argument that “it was their duty to extend the protection of international law to 
citizens wherever they might be.”134 The principle was subsequently extended to cover the 
protection of foreign investments and the investments made by aliens as well.135  
In cases where these rules were breached, it was argued that the home state had a right to 
intervene, seek redress and compensation, as the injury to the alien was considered an injury 
to its state.136 While diplomatic protection sought to provide justice in cases where it was not 
attainable from local remedies, abuse of this doctrine was not uncommon amongst foreign 
investors. This occasionally led to the intervention of states, sometimes with the use of force, 
that was based on nothing more than questionable evidence provided by their nationals. In 
some cases they did not even make use of the domestic judicial system.137 By nature, this 
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system of diplomatic protection favoured European countries and North America, which were 
economically and military advanced enough to impose these rules on other states.138 
The diplomatic protection of aliens also sought to establish an international minimum standard 
of treatment for aliens, which became another contested legal area between the capital-
exporting states and the host states. Given the fact that an internationally negotiated treaty on 
that subject matter did not exist, one had to draw on other sources of international law, like 
customary international law, in order to identify these standards.139 Since the capital exporting 
states, with the United States being on the forefront, were the ones arguing that foreign 
investors should be treated according to an international minimum standard, their practice 
had to be relied upon in order to determine these standards.140 Other sources of international 
law, like general principles, or the subsidiary sources also supported the practice of investor 
states, because the writings and case-law at the time were based upon the very behaviour of 
investor states.141 It is thus not surprising to find that the norms thus established, for the better 
part based on US domestic legal standards142, were rather favourable for the investor. As a 
consequence, this meant that whenever it was agreed upon to rely on international law or 
international minimum standards to conduct foreign investment disputes, the law made by 
investor countries was being applied.143 The minimum standard that capital-exporting states 
thereby created was sometimes difficult to fulfil for the host states and ended up being a 
higher than the host countries afforded their own nationals.144  
From the second half of the 19th century, Latin American countries were objecting to the 
principle of diplomatic protection, international minimum standards and the laws established 
by the investor states, concealed as international law. They argued that states should not be 
obliged to offer higher standards of legal protection to foreign investors than those offered to 
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their own nationals.145 They insisted on the need for equality of treatment and that, as long as 
they were not discriminating against foreign investors, they were not in breach of customary 
international law. They supported this notion with reference to the economic and legal frailty 
of the newly independent countries, which made it harder for them to conform with standards 
of treatment that economically developed countries demanded for their nationals.146 This 
position came to be known as the Calvo Doctrine, named after its spiritual father, the 
Argentinian diplomat and jurist, Carlos Calvo.147  
Calvo’s theoretical approach was based on the rule of sovereignty, generally accepted among 
European states and the US, and the equality among states, through which he sought to 
protect countries from interference by other states via the use (and abuse) of the diplomatic 
protection of aliens. The other principle he formulated was the absolute equality of foreigners 
and nationals, which implicated that aliens could not be afforded better treatment than 
nationals and thus had to file claims with local authorities, instead of external tribunals.148 As a 
consequence, this also meant that foreigners who were to settle in Latin American countries 
were able to enjoy the same rights and protections under domestic laws as the citizens of that 
state.149 Montt emphasises the point that the granting of positive rights constituted a major 
improvement at the time and a promotion of human rights.150 
Ultimately, the goal of the Calvo Doctrine was to minimise and eventually dispose of the 
omnipresent threat of intervention by foreign states whenever an investment or trade dispute 
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arose.151 While the Calvo Doctrine was clearly designed to combat the abusive use of 
diplomatic protection, it did not aim at opposing foreign investors and their investments in 
general. It also did not intend to thwart international claims that were based on the host 
country’s breach of established international rules concerning the treatment of aliens or such 
cases that were based on denial of justice.152 South American countries mainly sought to 
shape international laws in a way that would also incorporate their interests by including these 
provisions into treaties, constitutions, or municipal law.153 Despite their efforts, the enunciated 
norms failed to make a lasting impact on international law due to opposition from Europe and 
the US, who felt that these norms were not in their economical or political interest.154 
The Calvo Clause exemplified another attempt by South American countries to circumvent the 
abuse of diplomatic protection of aliens.155 It took the form of a contractual provision that 
required foreigners to subject themselves to the local judicial process and means of remedy, 
and to waive their right to call upon their home countries for diplomatic protection.156 Montt 
highlights that despite shared objectives, the Calvo Clause is “not a mere byproduct of the 
Doctrine”, as it did not operate unilaterally and went further than the Doctrine by trying to 
forbid diplomatic protection in general, even in cases of denial of justice.157 The Clause’s 
bilateralism was exemplified by the fact that the investors voluntarily surrendered their right to 
diplomatic protection and it based the legitimacy of this provision on the freedom of 
contract.158 The validity of the clause was questioned on the grounds that foreign investors 
might have been forced to accept it as a condition for doing business, thus making it 
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involuntary, and on the grounds that it was not the individual’s right to waive the sovereign’s 
power of diplomatic protection.159 The inability of an individual to waive the right to diplomatic 
protection was based on the Vatelian understanding that an injury to a national is an injury to 
her home state, which gives the state a right to intervene, irrespective of the individual’s 
contractual waiver.160 
This chapter outlined a short history of the history of foreign investment protection, underlining 
the fact that what has emerged as the bilateral investment treaty regime since the 1960s is 
the tip of the discipline’s iceberg. While the capital-exporting countries have been dominating 
this area of international law as well, it is important to be aware that legal resistance existed 
(and still exists) and that the Calvo Doctrine and Clause were one of the most elaborate tools 
in that regard. Looking at the history of foreign investment protection and the Calvo Doctrine 
and Clause inevitabley raises questions about the creation of international law and what we 
refer to as international law today. Given the fact that Latin American countries, as well as 
African and Asian countries, once independent, countries like China, Russia and Turkey161 
supported the principle of national treatment and that we now see the proliferation of external 
investment dispute settlement tribunals, shows that it is not only the majority of countries that 
establish international rules but that there clearly are other factors involved in the process as 
well. The colonial legacy definitely provided an advantage for the former colonisers, as they 
could enforce their vision of international law via superior military strength or, once the 
colonies were independent, via economic means.  
The fact that countries from the global South were denied domestic jurisdiction over 
investment disputes also has implications on their human rights obligations. Given that, 
thanks to investor-state investment arbitrations, the former have acquired a means to limit the 
state’s exercise of public authority. This means that they are now able to demand 
compensation in cases where a state operates in the public interest but by doing so, 
decreases the (expected) return of an investment. States have very limited possibilities of 
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intervention in this process as the investors do not have to exhaust local remedies first and 
there is no appeal mechanism available. How this effects the socio-economic human rights 
obligations of countries from the global South will be addressed in the next chapter. 
 
 5  Economic iberalism and Foreign Investment Protection 
This chapter attempts to use what has been established and outlined throughout the thesis 
and implement it into he analysis of today’s international foreign investment regime and its 
influence on state’s human rights obligations. The analysis of investment protection’s impact 
on human rights will mainly focus on countries from the global South.  
Drawing from the title of the thesis that refers to human rights abuses as “planned misery”, 
this chapter is going to look at how the overarching framework of economic liberalism, which 
asserted itself globally by the early 1980s, has created an environment that favoured 
economic growth over socio-economic development. Economic liberalism, also referred to as 
neo-liberalism, assumes that “all human activity is always already a commodity and the best 
way (leading to the greatest satisfaction possible ) is to organize these activities through a 
market.”162 As a consequence of this approach, things that have not been considered to be 
commodities before, were now being treated as such.163 Neoliberal policies, which apply this 
theory to the social realm, can also be found in the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) of 
the World Bank. SAPs are relevant in the context of “planned misery” because they “were 
supposed to lead to a reduction of debt by structurally adjusting […] economies so that they 
would export more and attract more foreign investment”.164 In effect, this meant a reduction of 
government spending, the liberalisation of the economy, devaluation and increased 
privatisations.165 In order for global South countries to receive aid and assistance from 
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institutions like the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and given the lack 
of other funding, they were left with little choice but to accept these structural adjustments.166 
These plans contained policies like the user-fee clause, which obliged states to charge fees 
for the receipt of health care, education or so-called water services,167 which effectively 
undermined and conflicted with the state’s obligation to ensure its citizens’ right to health and 
education.168  
A possible explanation for the ensuing neglect of economic, social and cultural rights can be 
found in the transfer of power from the state to private economic actors.169 This transfer 
limited the state, which ultimately is the entity upon which human rights obligations are 
imposed, in its competence to further implement human rights that might have been 
considered detrimental to further investments.170 It is therefore apparent that the 
implementation of human rights, which is also considered to be part of development, has 
economic implications.171 It requires resources and hence the economic policies of the state 
or international institutions also impact human rights.172  
What is striking, though, is the fact that much of the economic liberalisation and the 
subsequent power transfer has happened in the name of development. This kind of 
development, however, mainly focused on economic criteria (measured in GDP growth) and 
consequently neglected local needs and actualities.173 Unsurprisingly this approach caused 
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detrimental effects like the considerable disadvantage suffered by women and other already 
disadvantaged groups within the recipient countries, and an omission to provide for basic 
welfare services to ensure survival.174  
The following section will take a look at bilateral investment treaties (BITs), which have 
proliferated in the wake of the market liberalisation in the global South, and have become the 
preferred tool of capital exporting countries that want to protect their investments. After that 
follows an outline of what these treaties generally entail, with a particular emphasis on 
stabilisation clauses. 
The subsequent section will take a look at investment arbitration and its impact on human 
rights. While there are plenty of other aspects of the investment treaty regime that deserve a 
closer look, starting with the training and choice of the arbitrators, 3rd party access to the 
arbitration or the lack of appeal mechanisms, this section will mainly focus on arbitration 
cases. For a possible explanation of the lack of African arbitration cases, the section will 
examine the theory of “regulatory chill”, which assumes that fear of investor-state arbitration 
might discourage governments from implementing policies and regulations for the public 
good.  
 
5.1. The Bilateral Investment Treaty Regime and Human Rights 
Drawing from the understanding of what constitutes the investment treaty regime laid out in 
“The Political Economy of the Investment Treaty Regime”, this thesis understands it to consist 
of three components. These are the investment treaties, the institutions and rules governing 
the arbitration of investment disputes, and the decisions of arbitration tribunals which are 
applying and thus also interpreting the treaties.175 While this section is concerning itself with a 
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general overview of these elements and subsequently focuses on the provisions contained in 
the treaties, the following section will take a closer look at investment arbitration and its 
impact on human rights obligations of host states. 
Bilateral investment treaties, also known as BITs, are treaties with two or more states party to 
it and concern themselves with the protection of foreign investment.176 These kind of treaties 
are generally signed by a capital exporting state from the global North and a capital importing 
state from the global South. There are, however, increasing instances of countries from the 
global South concluding investment protection treaties amongst themselves.177  
What was the reason for the emergence of these treaties in the first place? 
A possible explanation can be found in the dissolution of formal colonialism after WWII and 
the fact that newly (formally) independent countries sought to change the international legal 
landscape in a way that would also respect their needs. As has been outlined before, the 
international law in general, as well as the one dealing with the protection of foreign 
investment and international commerce, has been dominated by the colonising countries of 
Europe, as well as the USA. Using the forum of the United Nations, the newly independent 
countries sought to implement the New International Economic Order (NIEO), which sought to 
remedy the imbalances of the hitherto existing international economic laws.178 Given the 
ensuing legal uncertainty following the challenge of the norms that investor states had 
advanced as customary laws and the lack of colonial control to remedy these gaps, investor 
states turned to treaties in order to secure the protection of investments.179 Sornarajah further 
highlights that multinational corporations (MNCs) “seek to manufacture at locations where 
cheap skilled labour as well as cheap resources are readily available”180 and that home 
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countries logically want to protect their MNCs when they enter these countries. The colonial 
imperialist venture had already created conditions that allowed European corporations to 
produce at a fraction of the costs and reap massive profits. The control over the investment 
protection which colonial rule granted, however, had to be replaced and BITs seemed to 
provide a promising set of tools to do just that. 
The failure of the creation of a multilateral agreement on investment protection, like the 
Multilateral Investment Agreement (MAI) within the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) or attempts at the World Trade Organization (WTO), might just be 
another reason for the emergence of BITs.181 
The first modern BIT was signed by West Germany and Pakistan in 1959 and a steady 
growth in the numbers of these treaties ensued.182 According to the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) there existed just under 400 treaties in 
1989, with numbers rising to just over 1000 treaties by 1995, almost 2000 by the year 2000 
and more than 3000 by 2016.183 Sornarajah accredits the proliferation of investment treaties 
in the 1990s to the spread of economic liberalism, with the United States and international 
financial institutions like the World Bank and the IMF as its driving forces.184 
These treaties, different as they might be in detail, share a general pattern that establishes a 
set of provisions, geared towards the protection of foreign investors and their investments.185 
They generally define what is considered to be an investment and who is considered to be an 
investor, provide for non-discrimination (including national treatment and most favoured 
nation treatment), the repatriation of profits, minimum standards of treatment (e.g. “fair and 
equitable treatment” or “full protection and security”), compensation in cases of direct or 
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indirect expropriation, and methods for dispute settlement.186 These treaties generally do not 
provide for rights for the host country apart from the ability to prohibit specific economic 
activities in general or to act on behalf of the public order, public health, and public morality.187 
Despite the right to take these actions, host states are still obliged to compensate investors 
for regulatory measures that affect the latter’s profits adversely.188 Given the fact that these 
compensations can induce high costs for governments, these treaties basically restrict a 
government’s authority and establish a system that creates rights but hardly any 
responsibilities for investors.189  
Given the rather detrimental effects on the host countries outlined above, one wonders what 
justifies this treaty regime. A common argument brought forward in favour of this system is 
that it provides an effective means for states to attract investment. There are, however, a few 
problems with the actual use of investment treaties and the underlying logic of this argument. 
Investors are granted quite a liberal approach by investment treaties when it comes to the 
choice of the nationality they want to acquire in case they want to bring claims against a host 
state – a technique also known as “forum-shopping”.190 This means that an investor can gain 
access to the treaty of a desired country by simply setting up a holding company in that 
country.191 Imagine state A entering into an investment contract with state B in hopes of 
attracting investments by the latter. Considering the liberal wording concerning the nationality 
of an investor in already existing contracts, investors from state B could just create a holding 
in state C, which already has concluded an investment treaty with state A, and thus enjoy all 
the benefits granted by the treaty. A contract between state A and state B would thus become 
superfluous. Likewise, though based on an expansive jurisdictional ruling,192 a domestic 
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business was able to make itself “foreign”, thus enabling it to bring a claim against its own 
country, by creating a holding company in a state that had already signed a BIT with the 
home country.193 The permissive nature of the liberal approach to forum-shopping displayed 
in these examples clearly defeats the purpose of treaties entered into with the intention to 
generate investment flows between the parties to the contract.194 
Another point concerning the supposed purpose of investment treaties as means for attracting 
foreign investment is the fact that they hardly impose any obligations on the investor’s home 
country that encourage it to increase its outward investments.195 Lastly, the fact that most of 
the investment treaties apply to already existing investments, also challenges the argument 
that they are supposed to generate new inflows of foreign investment.196 
Apart from these argumentative challenges to the claim that the conclusion of BITs attracts 
new investments, empirical studies also showed mixed results concerning the correlation 
between the signing of BITs and increased investment flows. While some studies found that 
signing BITs had little to no impact on investment flows197, one study found that there was a 
positive correlation between the signing of BITs and inflow of foreign investment.198 The 
conflicting evidence of these studies make for a less than convincing case in favour of the 
argument that the signing of BITs increases the inflow of foreign investment.  
These treaties, do, however grant foreign investors the right to have a determining influence 
on the behaviour of states. Stabilisation clauses are just another instance of the extraordinary 
status granted to foreign investors and their ability to circumvent democratic and domestic 
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judicial processes. They can be defined as “contractual clauses in private contracts between 
investors and host states that address the issue of changes in law in the host state during the 
life the project.”199 While not every investment treaty contains such a clause, they are most 
common in long-term investments made in the extractive industries and in contracts that 
concern public infrastructure and essential services.200 These clauses were initially deployed 
in order to mitigate risks for investors like nationalisations, arbitrary or discriminating legal 
measures, but in recent decades, investors have used these clauses in order to guard their 
assets against costs arising from environmental or social legislation.201 In order to reduce the 
perceived risks, so-called “full freezing clauses” render inapplicable any new laws that 
concern fiscal matters, as well as non-fiscal matters with regards to the investment.202 
“Limited freezing clauses” only apply to a specific set of laws and might for instance exempt 
an investment from any new labour laws.203 “Economic equilibrium clauses”, on the other 
hand, protect an investor against the financial effects of changes in the law. So instead of 
circumventing the applicability of new laws, an investor can demand financial compensation 
for simply complying with the law.204 In all of these instances, investors are basically being 
provided with a legal basis for resisting compliance with new laws.205  
The “Shemberg-report” on stabilisation clauses finds that there are regional differences in the 
application of these instruments.206 The use of stabilisation clauses has been more frequent in 
investment contracts concluded with developing countries, with broad full freezing clauses 
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being most common in contracts with Sub-Saharan countries and limited freezing clauses 
being used in the Middle East and North Africa; Latin America and the Caribbean; 
Eastern Europe, Southern Europe and Central Asia; South Asia; and Sub-Saharan Africa.207 
Equilibrium clauses, while used in every region of the sampled contracts, were more 
prevalent in non-OECD countries.208 Keeping in mind the history of colonial rule and 
exploitation that many of the non-OECD countries have experienced, it is not too surprising to 
find them on the receiving end of these restrictive provisions. It seems to be a continuation of 
the century long exercise of power by investors from the global North, with the support of their 
home states, over countries from the global South with different means.209 This situation 
seems very much reminiscent of the times of the imperial trading companies, which were also 
granted privileges usually reserved for a sovereign state and could rely on the support of their 
home state in cases where they were met with resistance.210 After the disruption of their social 
structures and being exposed to material exploitation for centuries, former colonies were 
denied to shape international economic laws in their favour and were subsequently more 
prone to give into this investment treaty regime. 
The contractual provisions contained in these treaties inevitably impact human rights. Human 
rights advocates have pointed out that the protection of investors is not being balanced with 
the state’s duty to regulate them, in order to protect human rights and with the investor’s 
responsibility to respect these rights.211 Furthermore, they argue that the payment for an 
investor’s compliance with the host country’s laws denies the state its role as legislator and 
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creates a hindrance for the implementation of social and environmental standards. These 
effects are aggravated in developing countries.212  
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5.2. Investment Arbitration and Human Rights 
Thanks to investment treaties’ inclusion of a provision that gives investors the status of a legal 
person under international law, they have been enabled to bring their own claims against host 
countries in cases where they allege that they have not been protected to the extent agreed 
upon.213 By accepting the investment treaty regime, states have effectively waived their 
immunity as a sovereign and have given external arbitration tribunals the right to decide over 
them.214 This seems to be another chapter in the long history of the struggle of capital-
importing countries for domestic jurisdiction over investment disputes and capital-exporting 
countries’ insistence on an external, allegedly impartial mechanism. In the absence of a 
multilateral agreement on investment protection, the proliferation of BITs seems to cement the 
capital-exporting countries’ position. 
There is no single entity that deals with all the investment disputes. The disputes may be 
referred to the World Bank's International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID), the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA), the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) and its International Court of Arbitration, the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
(PCA), the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC) or the UN 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).215 ICSID is the only of these institutions 
that provides publicly available information on the arbitration cases, which makes it harder to 
monitor the remaining arbitrations’ frequency, outcome, and impact on host countries’ 
policies.216  
Advocates of this system claim that the domestic judicial institutions of developing and 
transition countries (even those of developed countries) are not efficient enough, provide only 
inadequate remedies, are corrupt or just unreliable in general.217 At the same time, they are 
not taking any supportive actions to help the host countries address these issues but instead 
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enjoy the preferential treatment that they are granted by the investment treaties.218 If one 
considers the broad interpretations of treaty provision by arbitrators, contrary outcomes in 
almost identical cases, and the impossibility of those affected by the investors’ conduct to 
have standing in the arbitration, one might just conclude that the arbitration itself does not live 
up to the standards it demands from host countries.219 The fact that third parties hardly have 
any means to gain access to the arbitration, leaves investors in an exceptionally 
advantageous position to challenge state measures that are aimed at furthering socio-
economic development, like regulations aimed at environmental protection, subsidising 
fledging local industries, or implementing human rights in general.220 
There have been several cases that have seen the challenge of regulatory measures taken 
by the state in order to protect their citizens’ human rights (even if not mentioned explicitly in 
the arbitration hearings). 
Metalclad V Mexico221 was a case that dealt with the US-based Metalclad Corporation, which 
had purchased a Mexican corporation that had previously operated a hazardous waste 
treatment site in central Mexico.222 Despite warnings from Mexico’s state environmental 
officials not to invest in this site and opposition from local and state authorities, and NGOs, 
Metalclad was determined to follow through on the project.223 While the federal government 
had issued the company the required clearances, municipal approval was still pending. After 
the reception of an additional construction permit, Metalclad began its construction work.224 
The municipal authorities, however, still had not issued the permits but issued an “ecological 
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decree”, which declared a large era, including Metalclad’s hazardous waste facility, an 
ecological preserve in order to protect a rare species of cacti – effectively causing a blockage 
of the project.225 As a consequence, Metalclad filed a lawsuit under the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the tribunal found that Mexico’s prevention of Metalclad’s 
operation of the landfill, due to ecological concerns, constituted an act “tantamount to 
expropriation”.226 The company was eventually awarded US$16.7 million in compensation.227 
While this case does not mention human rights at all and seems to be focused on 
environmental issues, Article 12(2)(b) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) provides that states should take steps in order to achieve “[t]he 
improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene”228 The re-opening and 
operation of a waste site that was already known to have contaminated nearby reservoirs229 
cannot be considered to be in the interest of the local communities and their right to a healthy 
environment. The tribunal’s decision was also considered to be controversial, as it extended 
the meaning of expropriation beyond the hitherto established scope and exposed health and 
environmental regulations on behalf of the public good to challenges from investors.230 
Another case where investors brought claims against a state as a result of the exercise of its 
authority for the public good, was Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli & Others v. The Republic of 
South Africa.231 In this contentious case, a group of European investors filed suit against the 
South African government in the wake of a law that was geared towards the elimination of 
historical inequalities.232 The Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act’s (MPRDA) 
purpose was to promote greater participation of South Africa’s black citizens in the mining 
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sector because this sector was still lagging when it came to racial equity.233 The investors, 
Italian nationals who held about 80 per cent of South Africa’s stone exports, alleged a breach 
of South Africa’s BIT with Italy and its BIT with Belgium and Luxembourg, via their holding in 
Luxembourg.234 They claimed that they had been denied fair and equitable treatment due to 
affirmative action obligations created under the MPRDA, which obligated them to hire black or 
historically disadvantaged managers and sell 26 per cent of their shareholding to persons 
from that group.235 While taken out of context this might seem to be an unfair requirement, 
one has to keep in mind that due to the historical oppression and systemic exploitation, South 
African natives have been denied their fair share of the profits that their resource generate for 
an undue amount of time. Furthermore, Article 1(2) of the ICESCR states that “[a]ll peoples 
may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice 
to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle 
of mutual benefit, and international law”236 and Article 25 affirms the “inherent right of all 
peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and resources.”237 While this 
case was ultimately settled outside the arbitration tribunal and the investors were ordered to 
pay the arbitration costs of EUR400,000, it still sent a disturbing signal to governments who 
were committed to the inclusion of historically disadvantaged groups and human rights.238 
In the same vein, there have also been a few cases concerning regulatory measures of host 
states with regards to privatised water supplies. In Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United 
Republic of Tanzania239, a German-British consortium, the investors, were assigned with the 
upgrade and management of water and sanitation infrastructure in Tanzania. 240 In the course 
of their action they seemingly underestimated the difficulties that came with the realisation of 
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this project and also excluded the people living in the poorest areas from their service.241 The 
difficulties encountered by Biwater eventually led to a deterioration of its services and money 
owed to the Tanzanian government, which subsequently led to the latter’s cancellation of the 
contract after two years (of an initially planned 10 year tenure).242 Unsurprisingly, Biwater 
initiated an arbitration process with ICSID and requested US$20 million, as it alleged an 
expropriation by the Tanzanian government.243 While the tribunal agreed on the fact that an 
expropriation existed, no compensation was awarded due to the investor’s poor planning that 
led to a massive devaluation by the time the contract was terminated.244 
While the right to water is not contained in the ICESCR as such – though one might argue 
that it is implicitly included in Articles that refer to natural resources245 – efforts have been 
made to include it into the canon of human rights.246 Other cases that saw investors initiate 
investment arbitration due to states’ attempts to keep the use of water affordable for its 
citizens or to counteract deteriorating services provided by the investors include, among 
others: Urbaser and CABB v. Argentina,247 Vivendi v. Argentina,248 and AWG v. Argentina.249  
These cases highlight the fact that states, while acting in their natural capacity and trying to 
secure their citizens’ enjoyment of human rights, must always be wary to not disgruntle an 
investor.  
The fear of an impending investment arbitration and a possible loss, which might bring with it 
large damage awards, is known as “regulatory chill”.250 As a consequence, a state might be 
generally less inclined to introduce new rules and regulations that are geared towards the 
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protection of the environment, or the domestic implementation of human rights.251 While the 
extent of regulatory chill varies, depending on the decision makers and the country, there is 
little evidence that proves that concern about impending arbitrations is internalised in 
decision-making processes.252 
The choice of the cases is reflecting the analytical focus of this thesis on the global South. 
There are, however, also cases against countries from the global North that dealt with claims 
brought against them pursuant to the implementation of measures that were aimed at the 
public good.253 Nevertheless, it is a striking feature that the majority of the (known) claims 
against states have been made against developing or transition states.254 These countries are 
already struggling to fulfil their socio-economic human rights obligations, due to limited access 
to or enjoyment of their natural resources and the profit it could generate. The magnitude of 
some of the damages that arbitration tribunals award, thus have a significantly higher impact 
on their budgets than they might have on an economically more developed country.255 The 
way investment treaties have been used in the above mentioned cases seems to diverge 
from their initial purpose of protecting investors against arbitrary and volatile acts of host 
states.256 Now, investment arbitrators that have not been elected or appointed by a 
democratic process are able to interfere with state regulations, in cases where investors feel 
that they are not conducive for business.257 Considering that the investment treaty regime is 
equipped with “one of the most powerful systems of international adjudication in modern 
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history”258 and that it was able to transfer power from states to investors and from domestic 
courts to international arbitration tribunals, it seems that the creation of a system of economic 
control that supplanted colonial imperialism, has come full circle. While investors are trying to 
conserve or possibly expand this system, they are (knowingly or not) also maintaining and 
aggravating “socio-economic arrangements”259 that induce the misery of human rights 
abuses. 
 
 6  Conclusion 
This thesis attempted to combine several different subject areas, that, on the face of it, do not 
seem to be related. There are, however, elements that provide for a connection of these 
seemingly different subjects. The overarching themes that connects the different parts of the 
thesis have been Europe’s colonial imperialism and its intellectual justification through the 
concepts of development and progress.  
Europe’s colonial exploitation and control of regions that were not officially under colonial rule 
were, among other things, also fuelled by economic desires, with corporations the British and 
Dutch East Indian Companies at the forefront of this trend. An alleged duty to “uplift” the 
newly discovered peoples and “enlighten” them with European civilisation served as a 
justification at home and provided the venture with a philanthropic disguise. During this 
process of supposed civilisation, the forced and sometimes brutal restructuring of societies to 
better serve the colonisers needs, laid the foundation of what this thesis refers to as “planned 
misery”: “misery that belongs with the logic of particular socio-economic arrangements.”260 
It was also during these times that European regional laws were confronted with entities that 
it, one the one hand did not consider part of the legal realm, but on the other hand had to 
include into the legal realm in order to prevent disputes of colonial possessions among 
European states. The laws governing commercial relations that had thus been created were 
geared towards the consolidation of European economic hegemony. They disregarded 
previously existing systems and forced these regulations onto those under their colonial 
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control or used (the threat of) superior military force in order to impose them on countries that 
were not under their direct control.  
Those subjected to this rule fiercely contested it and the countries of South America, which 
had acquired their sovereignty well before other colonies, brought forward one of the most 
memorable legal defences: the Calvo Doctrine and Clause. These legal theories sought to 
end the abuse of diplomatic protection of aliens by foreign investors and claim domestic 
jurisdiction over arising investment disputes.  
With the end of WWII and the ensuing wave of decolonisation, it seemed as if the former 
colonies were now finally accepted as sovereign states and enabled to shape the 
international laws that govern them. The newly revived development discourse of the time, 
now focused on economic development, proved to be a convenient tool in the inhibition of 
these plans.261 Given the unsurprisingly poor conditions that most of the newly independent 
countries were in after decades and centuries of colonial exploitation, the economic 
development discourse simply ignored the historical circumstances and labelled these 
countries “poor”. While the newly independent countries’ socio-economic structures had 
indeed been ruptured in such a way that they were no longer able to fend for themselves, 
their attempts to countervail these developments via the United Nations was unsuccessful 
due to global North opposition. 
The cure that international financial institutions (dominated by countries from the global North) 
envisaged was the liberalisation of former colonies’ markets in order to increase foreign 
investment and privatisations. In the absence of a multilateral agreement on foreign 
investment protection, bilateral investment treaties became the preferred option. While the 
positive effect of these treaties on the host countries is contentious, they certainly have 
provided foreign investors with unprecedented powers. The privileges that these treaties grant  
investors, including the possibility to challenge regulatory measures taken by the state in 
favour of the public good, unequally disadvantage developing countries. 
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It is this complex system of control that is being asserted on developing states, that the author 
finds to create the socio-economic conditions for the proliferation of misery in the global 
South. 
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